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n the last twenty years, lawyers,
judges, and litigants have become in-
creasingly accus omed to using me-
diators to help settle legal disputes. The
growing acceptance of mediation in the
litigation context raises a puzzling ques-
tion, however. Given that transactional
negotiations are in some ways quite sim-
ilar to dispute resolution, why has there
been no corresponding rise of mediation
in deal-making?
Transactional legal practice can be as
adversarial as litigation. Deals break
down. Communication falters. Relation-
ships sour. Emotions rise. There often are
strong advocates, whether lawyers or cli-
ents, on each side in major transactions.
Those advocates frequently take posi-
tions and push for advantage. These are
the same bargaining dynamics that can
make a mediator valuable in settling dis-
putes. Why then, don't mediators help
contracting parties as they try to close
deals, just as mediators help litigating
parties reach settlement?
This article analyzes the use of media-
tors in dispute resolution and in deal-
making. It briefly presents the benefits
of transactional mediation and address-
es whether it may be a growth area for
the mediation community.' Some recent
research suggests mediators already are
serving in this capacity, although spo-
radically. The article discusses reasons
transactional mediation has not been
used more often and provides a rationale




To address how transactional media-
tors may be effective in deal-making, it
is essential to first examine why media-
tors are used in the litigation context. The
alternative dispute resolution ("ADR")
community-both scholarly and practi-
cal-has said remarkably little about this
matter. Practicing mediators often give
a quick, simple, and somewhat vague re-
sponse when asked what they do: "We
help parties settle."
As a general matter, however, media-
tors play four important functions in dis-
pute resolution. As discussed below, me-
diators can: (1) discover whether settle-
ment is possible; (2) help the parties find
value-creating trades; (3) manage psy-
chological barriers to agreement; and (4)




A mediator can solicit and compare pri-
vate information about the parties, their
willingness to settle, their concerns, and
their priorities. A mediator can, for exam-
ple, confidentially compare a defendant's
offer and a plaintiffs demand to deter-
mine if they overlap. A private compari-
son of this sort may encourage parties to
take more reasonable positions than they
would otherwise, because a confidential
offer or demand sends no signal to the
other side about a party's bottom line.
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could be helpful in deal-making, just as they are in
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use of mediators and presents preliminary evidence
that transactional mediation already is taking place.
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Put differently, parties often exaggerate
demands and minimize offers because
they fear exploitation. Each is concerned
that if he or she states a true bottom line,
the other side will take advantage. If both
parties think and act this way, their offers
and demands may never overlap. By cre-
ating the possibility of private exchanges,
mediators can help the parties discover




Mediators also can use their access to
private information to help parties find
value-creating trades. Much has been writ-
ten about interest-based problem solving
and the promise it offers to disputing par-
ties. 2 Rather than merely fighting over
what a court would do, parties instead can
explore their underlying concerns and pri-
orities to discover whether there are trades
that could make one party better off at a
low cost to the other.
By allocating assets and risks to the per-
son who values or can absorb them most
efficiently, negotiators theoretically "ex-
pand the pie." Unfortunately, this does not
always happen. Instead, strategic postur-
ing may limit the parties' abilities to find
value-creating options or trades. By inter-
viewing parties privately to discover inter-
ests and search for trades, a mediator may
add value to the parties' negotiations.
Mitigate Psychological
Barriers to Settlement
Mediators can add value by mitigating
the effects of cognitive and social psycho-
logical biases and heuristics that can im-
pede settlement. Much work recently has
been done exploring such "behavioral" as-
pects of negotiation and mediation.3 In gen-
eral, mediators can help parties manage
several psychological effects.
Parties often are systematically over-
confident in their judgments and beliefs.
Mediators may be able to help them over-
come such overconfidence. Similarly, me-
diators may be able to help parties avoid
"reactively devaluing" each other's propos-
als merely because they come from an ad-
versary.
Mediators also may be able to help par-
ties overcome a phenomenon referred to
as "loss aversion," which tends to make a
person more willing to gamble to avoid a
sure loss than the same person would risk
to secure a gain. By framing possible solu-
tions in ways that mitigate these psycho-
logical biases, mediators can help parties
to behave more rationally.
Manage Emotional and
Relational Issues
Mediators often manage emotional, re-
lational, and communication problems
among disputing parties. Mediators may
empathize with upset parties or help the
parties empathize with each other. They
may be able to help the parties continue
talking, despite a damaged relationship.
Mediators also may slow down the com-
munication process to add clarity to what
otherwise may be a difficult negotiation.
In summary, mediators serve various
roles. They can use their positions as neu-
trals to add value through information
gathering and comparison. They also can
use their third-party perspectives to help
identify and manage psychological, emo-
tional, and relational difficulties. These are
some of the functions that have led to the




The legal community tends to assume
that litigation is more adversarial than
transactional work. Nonetheless, any
transactional attorney can provide exam-
ples of deals that died prematurely or were
concluded at great cost and aggravation be-
cause of adversarial posturing and ten-
sions. This suggests that contract negoti-
ations sometimes present some of the same
barriers to successful resolution that are
found in litigation settlement.
On closer inspection, this is indeed the
case. In each domain, there are incentives
for parties to behave strategically to get
more for their side, psychological barriers
that may get in the way of an agreement,
and emotions that can run high and cause
relations to sour.
Parties may take extreme positions on
deal terms or contract language and, thus,
find themselves in a deadlock. They may
miss value-creating trades that could make
one or both better off They may be mired
in psychological, emotional, and relation-




Deals and disputes differ in important
ways, and it is important not to overdo the
case for transactional mediation. There is
a powerful argumentfor why transaction-
al mediation is relatively unknown. Deals,
the explanation runs, are concluded in
competitive markets. If party A cannot ne-
gotiate satisfactorily with party B, then
party A will move on and do the deal with
party C. This ability to exit negotiations
and turn to the market diminishes the
ability of A, B, or C to be strategic, to pos-
ture, and to be adversarial.
In litigation, the parties are stuck with
each other-party A either settles the case
with B or goes to court. This is a "bilateral
monopoly," where neither party can walk
away. As such, it permits strategic or ad-
versarial bargaining.
In transactional negotiations, by con-
trast, the competitive market should "dis-
cipline" adversarial posturing and make
things more civil. Put differently, neither
party in a transaction can price above mar-
ginal cost, because doing so would invite
another more competitive party to enter
the negotiation and underbid them.
Seen through this economic lens, deals
and disputes look less similar. Instead, the
following closely-related hypotheses
emerge:
1. Transactions conducted in competi-
tive markets should be less strategic
and adversarial. Thus, mediators
would not be involved in assisting in
such transactions.
2. Transactions conducted in "bilateral
monopoly"-type markets should be
more strategic and adversarial, simi-
lar to disputes. It is more likely that
mediators would assist in those trans-
actions.
These hypotheses predict that mediation
will arise in markets that have bargaining




Although mediation is not well known
in transactional work, there are some sig-
nificant exceptions. One context in which
mediators routinely assist parties in try-
ing to form contracts is labor-management
negotiations. Although such negotiations
often are portrayed as "disputes," techni-
cally they are deals, albeit special ones. In
labor relations, the parties are trying to cre-
ate a contract. The presence of a union re-
moves (or greatly weakens) management's
ability to go to the market in search of al-
ternative sources of labor and, thus, the
negotiations are like the bilateral monop-
oly that is found in litigation. It is no sur-
prise, therefore, that mediators are active
in assisting such parties.
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Similarly, certain markets present clear
bilateral monopolies. One modern exam-
ple is the sale of Internet domain names.
Suppose Party A holds a domain name and
Party B wishes to purchase it for use by
Party B's new company. There is only one
available seller and (most likely) only one
interested buyer. In such circumstance,
there is great incentive to hold out and bar-
gain hard. Not surprisingly, domain name
transfers have given rise to a fairly com-
plex mediation and dispute resolution sys-
tem to help buyers and sellers overcome
these problems.4
Survey of Mediators
To find out whether mediators are in-
volved in deal-making, the author conduct-
ed a national survey of more than 122
practicing mediators. It was a fairly infor-
mal survey in which participants indicat-
ed the types of mediations they had con-
ducted over the last several years.
Although the survey is not perfect, and
its results are not necessarily statistically
significant or valid, it is a suggestive first
start. The survey asked mediators about:
(1) the nature of their practice; (2) the types
of disputes they typically handle; (3) their
experience level; (4) whether they had ever
mediated in a pre-closing transaction, with
specific examples provided, including real
estate, employment contract formation,
and labor-management; and (5) if they had
been involved in transactional negotia-
tions, details of that experience.
The survey indicated that approximate-
ly 39 percent of the mediators had been
involved in transactional mediation. Forty-
eight of the 122 mediators surveyed indi-
cated that they had mediated in at least
one transaction. These transactions ranged
in value from $100,000 to $26 million and
included the following examples:
" Assisting with negotiations over the
formation of a partnership of practic-
ing physicians
" The sale of a motorcycle dealership
" The formation of pre-nuptial agree-
ments and domestic partnerships
" Re-allocation of property rights and
governance in a golfing community
" The establishment of a joint venture
between a small business and a For-
tune 500 company
* The sale of cable television access
rights
* Formation of a cross-country ski
league
" Creation of a houseboat community
association
" Creation of a joint venture to produce
software
" Negotiations over the terms of a real
estate brokerage contract
" The transfer of control within a close-
ly held software development firm
" The formation of a partnership to own
an airplane (the parties needed to
work out issues as varied as fees and
the placement of stickers on the tail
fin)
" The negotiation of"angel funding" for
a privately held business
" Mergers between two or more corpo-
rations.
These examples from the survey seem
to support the two hypotheses laid out
above. Many, even most, of the examples
either have or easily could have bilateral
monopoly characteristics. For example,
the transfer of control within a closely held
software company could involve one sell-
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er and only one potential buyer. In such
circumstances, as already explained, each
party may have incentive to bargain hard
and push for a greater share of the prover-
bial pie. Given those incentives, it is not
surprising that mediators are beginning
to step in to help.
As expected, the majority of mediators
in the survey (61 percent) did not indicate
involvement in transactional mediations.
The idea of transactional mediation as a
field is new, and there has been little dis-
cussion of it to date in mediation literature,
trainings, and conferences. Moreover, as
discussed above, in most markets, it makes
little sense to involve a neutral in deal-
making. Only when a market is highly im-
perfect-when bilateral monopoly condi-
tions exist, for example-will strategic bar-
gaining make sense and a mediator be





makes sense in some contexts, most medi-
ators have never heard of it. Why is this?
First, the ADR movement has several deep
roots, none of which connects to the trans-
actional or deal-making world. The mod-
em ADR movement grew out of the con-
flict resolution traditions of the Quakers
and other religious groups, many of which
were active in the 1800s and early 1900s.
Since the 1970s, ADR has developed as an
alternative to litigation and a way to re-
lieve stress on the court system. Judges,
academics, and practitioners have seen
mediation as a complement to the estab-
lished judicial system. This history thus
has connected the modern use of media-
tion directly to litigation, but not to trans-
actional work.
In addition, the modern ADR move-
ment, like any movement, has had its
counter-cultural tendencies. One of those
tendencies has been to justify itself as a
better alternative than going to court. Al-
though this approach helped to market
mediation early on, it perhaps has result-
ed in a lack of development of positive jus-
tifications for and definitions of the prac-
tice. As noted earlier, there has been re-
markably little discussion about exactly
how mediators add value above and be-
yond what negotiating parties can do for
themselves. A close examination of that
question, however, leads naturally to the
realization that mediation might be able
to help negotiators-not just disputants.
Perhaps most important, understanding
of negotiation and dispute resolution have
made possible the sort of analysis summa-
rized in this article. There are two trends
worth highlighting. First, negotiation schol-
ars are turning to various disciplines to ad-
vance the understanding of bargaining.
This also is increasingly true in mediation
scholarship. By using economics and psy-
chology, similarities begin to emerge that
previously were obscured.
Second, negotiation scholars are becom-
ing more interested in deal-making and
transactional bargaining generally. Indeed,
legal scholarship on contracts, corporate
law, mergers and acquisitions, and other
deal-related areas has become more inter-
twined with negotiation scholarship. It
may be only a matter of time before these
same interests connect to scholarship on
mediation.
Conclusion
It is worth reiterating that transaction-
al mediation is very new. There are no
books to read about it yet, and no seminars
to attend on how to do it. Additionally, not
many mediators are doing such work. Nev-
ertheless, there are strong theoretical and
practical reasons that transactional medi-
ation makes good sense. Both mediators
and transactional lawyers may wish to
consider how ADR can impact transac-
tional work through the use of mediators
and other neutrals during transactional
negotiations.
NOTES
1. This article is based on a longer forthcom-
ing article by the author. See Peppet, "Contract
Formation in Imperfect Markets: Should We
Use Mediators in Deals?" to be published in
Ohio State J on Dispute Resolution (Feb. 2004).
2. For an in-depth discussion of value creation
in the context of legal negotiations, see Mnoo-
kin, Peppet, and Tulumello, Beyond Winning:
Negotiating to Create Value in Deals and Dis-
putes (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press,
2000). See also Fisher, Ury, and Patton, Getting
to YES, 2d ed. (New York, NY: Penguin Books,
1991).
3. For a useful introduction to this field, see
Arrow et al., Barriers to Conflict Resolution
(Cambridge, MA: PON Books, 1999).
4. See Parchomovsky, "On Trademarks, Do-
main Names, and Internal Auctions," Univ. Ill.
L.Rev. 211 (2001). U
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